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1. Introduction 
 
Tibetan identity inside Chinese territory, despite (or because of) its elusive nature, has been one of the 
most fervently disputed topics within the exile community, its supporters and by the Chinese 
government.  Although journalists and academics in different fields have also expressed their views on 
the issue, these tend to be highly polarised, as has often been pointed out1 – either representing a 
pro-China depiction of Tibetans as one of patriotic China’s minorities who enjoy cultural expression and 
economic prosperity under a benevolent communist governance, or the pro-exile representations of 
Tibetans as a people whose cultural and religious identity has been thoroughly obliterated, and who 
passively endure Chinese repression and persecution.  Whilst it is true that this ideological gap is 
fuelled by a lack of access to contemporary Tibet (ethnically Tibetan regions in China, particularly, TAR 
[Tibet Autonomous Region]) and its people, the argumentation on both sides, with the exception of a few 
(e.g. Barnett 2005), seems inevitably prone to oversimplification, thus failing to reflect the complex 
nature of Tibetan lives inside China.  From a reversed perspective, it could be said that disregarding 
the conflicting or deviant character of contemporary Tibetan identity may be necessary if one is to 
sustain an unambiguous stance. 
In this article, I want to address the conflicting nature of Tibetan identity, by focusing on the 
elite Tibetan youth educated in China, their cultural experiences and national identities.  The Tibetan 
youth I am presenting here are called Xizangban students, who are annually selected by examination 
from a variety of regions within the TAR and sent to interior China (Ch: Neidi) for their secondary 
education.  This educational system is considered a significant part of the Chinese civilisation project 
for its minorities (e.g. Harrell 1995), but often criticised by outsiders as sheer ‘assimilation’ (e.g. Wang 
and Zhou 2003, Lafitte 2003).   
These young Tibetans are constantly confronted with their ethnic peculiarity and inferiority 
under the gaze of Han Chinese in interior China.  Once they return to Tibet, they are again regarded 
as ‘odd’, this time by their fellow Tibetans.  For a significant part of their youth, they are exposed to a 
set of conflicting and polarised values, such as Chinese/Tibetan, civilised/backward, modern/traditional 
                                                     1 For example, see Powers (2004).  Also see Okawa’s analysis (2011) on various academic discourses on the Tibetan incidents of 
spring 2008.  Investigating apparently ‘less political’ stances that connect the Tibet Issue to the economic problem, he argues that 
they also tend to be trapped in a hidden political agenda, explicitly or by not aligning themselves with the arguments of either 
pro-China proponents or pro-exiles.  This tendency, he argues, demonstrates the operation of the ‘law of excluded middle’, which 
excludes vital elements constituting the Tibet Issue, dismissing thereby contradictions and internal discrepancies.  
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and scientific/superstitious, which prevail in a wide variety of socio-political contexts.  As will be 
discussed, these Tibetan youth attempt to cultivate their ethnic ambiguities through embracing, 
rejecting and extracting what the above polarities mean to them. 
 This article has two aims.  Firstly it aims to examine this controversial educational system 
and its political implications, the natures of which have hitherto rarely been analysed.  Secondly it 
aims to attempt to proffer, despite its intrinsic conceptual difficulty, an alternative perspective on 
‘Tibetan identity’ inside Chinese territory, through ethnographic descriptions of the Xizangban students.  
In order to comprehend the topic from a different angle, a modern Tibetan fantasy of Japan, as 
developed and ‘Buddhist,’ will also be briefly discussed. 
 
 
2.  An Overview of the Xizangban (Tibet Class) Programme 
 
In 1984, when Tibet remained economically devastated in the wake of the disastrous Cultural 
Revolution, the central government proclaimed its establishment of an educational programme under 
the slogan Zhili Yuanzang (Aid Tibet by Intelligence).  The severe lack of skilled and reliable cadres of 
Tibetan ethnicity at that time was considered as an immense obstacle to stabilise Tibet’s economic and 
political situation. 2   This was the main backdrop against which the Xizangban (Tibet Class) 
programme, the main imperative of which is to educate selected and able Tibetan children in the 
interior China, was initiated.  Accordingly, Xizangban were set up inside some prestigious Chinese 
secondary schools, and Xizangxiao (Tibet School), where Tibetans are exclusively enrolled, were 
established in the Han majority of developed metropolises, such as Beijing and Shanghai3.  For nearly 
three decades, about thirty-five thousand4 Tibetan children have been sent to acquire “sophisticated” 
and “civilised” educations in those secondary or higher institutions.  More than twenty thousand 
graduates are said to have already returned to Tibet to work in various governmental units or within 
Tibet’s promising industries, such as tourism. 
 The children who participate in the Xizangban programme are in principle graduates of 
elementary schools in TAR, and most are of Tibetan ethnicity5.  The selection examination involves 
                                                     2 It is very likely that the then Beijing’s decision to decrease the large number of Han Chinese officials in the TAR government is a 
significant environment for establishing the Xizangban programme. 3  At the moment (2014), there are fifty-three educational institutions of Xizangban (Tibet Class) or Xizangxiao (Tibet School) set up 
in eighteen provinces or cities throughout China.  In official documents, the designation Xizangban(xiao) is normally utilised to 
signify both, but this article follows the colloquial custom of calling it simply Xizangban. 4  This number is confirmed in a speech by the vice-chairman of the TAR, Meng Deli, during the conference for training the 
principals of Xizangban schools on the 18th June 2010 (Xizang Ribao 2010 June 19).  However, the number of ‘about thirty-five 
thousand’ might not reflect the reality in a strict sense, since it can reasonably be suspected (as locally rumoured) that affluent Tibetan 
families, although these are limited in number, send their children to the Xizangban programme without necessarily following official 
procedures, accessing the programme through personal connections, bribery, and so on. 5  The children of Han Chinese and other nationalities are also entitled to participate in the Xizangban programme.  Its statistical 
number is not publicly announced, but for example, among three hundred and fifty-seven selected children in Lhasa in 2010, 
forty-nine of them were Han Chinese (Lasa Wanbao 2010 July 15).  Considering that the programme was originally only for Tibetans, 
it is notable that quite a high proportion of Han Chinese from Lhasa are accepted onto it, although this is less likely in less urban areas 
outside Lhasa, due to the relative small population of Han Chinese there. 
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academic subjects such as mathematics, Chinese and Tibetan languages, but also health checks and 
assessments of “moral attitude” (sixiang pinde).  About two thousand pupils are selected each year, and 
more than seventy percent of them are said to be from nomadic or agricultural backgrounds (Guo 2008: 
100).  Given the statistical fact that around eighty percent of the whole population in TAR reside in 
rural areas,6 it can be said that the selection is relatively fair.  The tuition fees and all the living costs 
of Xizangban students are largely subsidised by the TAR, central and host provincial government, but 
due to the recent economic development of Tibet, part of students’ expenses are now required to be paid 
by their respective families. 
 As early as in the late 1980s, understandably, such distant schooling was hardly considered 
valuable by many Tibetan parents, who would have been gravely concerned with the mental as well as 
the social welfare of their children if they were to study far away at such a sensitive age.  However, the 
programme has gradually become popular, even beginning to be widely accepted, especially in Lhasa 
since quite a few parents there wish their children to have a high quality education in order to afford 
them a promising future in terms of their careers and marriages.  Particularly, since around the early 
2000s, Lhasa parents have become so keen to get their children admitted into the Xizangban,7 that 
pupils appear to be under tremendous pressure – both from their parents and schools who compete with 
each other for the coveted places in the programme.8 
The Tibetan children who enter the programme are taken thousands of miles away from their 
homes.  In their first year they are trained to remedy academic deficiencies in terms of the programme, 
particularly to improve their spoken and written Chinese.  For the following three years, except for a 
few Tibetan language classes, they take almost the same academic subjects as other Han Chinese 
children do, and they are taught through Chinese textbooks, in Chinese language and by Chinese 
teachers.  For these four continuous years the children are not permitted to return to Tibet even during 
holidays.  Upon their graduation, some are promoted to Han Chinese dominated senior secondary 
schools, whilst many students enrol in vocational schools or Xizangxiao (Tibet School) to study for 
another three years.  Again, except for the short period before the enrolment, these Tibetan children 
are not allowed to return to their homes during their schooling days, during which time the only 
opportunities they have to interact with their ethnic fellows are those with classmates living in the 
same dormitories.  For these seven years, particularly for the first four years of Xizangban, the top 
priorities of education are patriotism (or Han-Tibetan friendship), revolutionary tradition, and other 
state-oriented national moralities (Zhu 2007).  It is unsurprising, therefore, that the Tibetan children 
                                                     6 See, for example, Tibet Statistical Yearbook 2014. 7 Lhasa people’s tremendous concern with the Xizangban is reflected in a local newspaper.  After the official announcement on the 
result of the selection examination, Lasa Wanbao (Lhasa Evening News) puts the names of all the selected pupils, their ethnicities, the 
names of their parents, and even the government unit or company they belong to. 8 In 2007, the abolition of the Xizangban programme was widely rumoured in Lhasa and beyond.  An obvious background for this is 
that the educational level in Lhasa has been rapidly improving since the last two decades, and it can be fairly presumed that the 
authorities had begun to recognise this transformation.  However, a main incentive for the abolition, as I was informed by a relevant 
official, is apparently presented by the educational authorities in the TAR, who have expressed concern over the excessive degree of 
pressure that the prospect of admittance to the Xizangban programme causes parents and schools to place on young children. 
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on the Xizangban programme naturally start to affiliate themselves with Chinese language, customs 
and worldview, since they are dissociated from Tibetan language and culture, particularly Buddhist 
customs.  This impact on young Tibetan elites is immense and, as elaborated later, it constitutes the 
main obstacle for them when attempting to re-enter the Tibetan cultural soil. 
 Some competent students, after completing their Xizangban programme, may enter 
universities in China to specialise further9.  Noticeably, however, the majority of the Tibetan children, 
after their seven or eleven years of ‘China experiences’, return to Tibet.  Their economic as well as 
social statuses are generally promising due to their excellent command of Chinese language, acquired 
expertise and cultural level (wenhua chengdu); most of them in fact occupy lucrative positions, such as 
those of government officials, entrepreneurs, engineers, teachers and interpreters (or tour guides), thus 
constituting a prominent section of the so-called ‘(upper) middle class’ that has recently emerged in 
Lhasa. 
 Steven Harrell, in his inspiring discussion of Chinese civilising projects concerning their 
ethnic minorities, encourages us to look at the Gramscian notion of hegemony, through which he intends 
to shed light on the complicity of ethnic people (Harrell 1995).  He proposes the term, ‘compradore 
elites’ (compradore means ‘buyer’ in Portuguese, originally referring to a Chinese agent working for a 
foreign company) for the peripheral or colonised peoples who play active roles in Chinese modernising or 
colonising projects (ibid: 34).  It seems that the political position of Harrell's ‘compradore elites’ are the 
one that our Xizangban elites, forged out of the national imperatives of the Chinese state, are expected 
to occupy as reliable ethnic agents for civilising Tibet and its people. 
 
 
3. Various Perspectives on Xizangban 
 
Views regarding the Xizangban programme and its participants are, unsurprisingly, presented by a 
variety of political factions.  It is worth introducing the discrepancies among them briefly here, since it 
helps to highlight the problems inherent in Xizangban, and those within us as observers of it. 
 Critical or negative opinions of the Xizangban programme are, generally speaking, held by 
researchers based in Western institutions.  For example, US based Chinese educationalists Wang and 
Zhou (2003) argue that the dislocated schooling of Xizangban purposefully discourages the nurturing of 
Tibetan identity and pride, due to the non-existence of culturally responsive pedagogy.  Tibet 
Information Network (TIN) reports that the objective of Xizangban is to Sinicise Tibetan children to 
such an extent that they become “essentially ignorant about their own culture and bereft of any feelings 
for their own nationality and nationality interests” (TIN 1999: 11).  Lafitte, a Tibet policy analyst, sees 
the Xizangban education system as sheer “assimilation”, further implying that, for many Tibetans, 
Chinese modernity is “attainable at too great a cost to personal integrity” (2003: 13), the implication of 
which is that Lafitte views a Xizangban education and the maintenance of Tibetan identity as radically 
                                                     9  There is a tendency for Tibetan students from the TAR to choose science, business and other ‘useful’ subjects to study at university, 
whereas it is largely Amdo Tibetans outside the TAR (in parts of the neighbouring provinces of Sichuan, Qinghai and Gansu) who 
study Tibetan culture and language as their specialities. 
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incompatible.  To my bewilderment and surprise, in the initial stage of my research into the Xizangban 
programme, a Tibetophile of my acquaintance who works for Amnesty International, perhaps out of 
sincere concern, was discouraging because she was adamant that Tibetans engaged in Xizangban were 
“China’s spies”, and warned me I should not consider working with them. 
 As these negative views on the Xizangban explicitly highlight, one would expect a certain 
degree of ‘Sinicisation’ among the students, and I would raise no objections to the notion that those 
Tibetan children are enormously associated with Chinese language and customs and, to a significant 
degree, alienated from Tibetan ones.  However, is it not perhaps simplistic to hold that ‘Tibetan 
identity’ is thoroughly depreciated during their Xizangban schooling in China, as the above outsiders 
argue?  Does ‘Sinicisation’ inevitably involve the dissipation of ‘Tibetan identity’?  Among the exile 
community and their sympathisers, it is generally believed that Tibetan Buddhist traditions in China 
were forcefully eliminated, or fabricated in the interests of the state.  This stance generally involves an 
enduring assumption that Tibetans inside the Chinese territory are passive, oppressed victims, 
deprived of ‘Tibetan-ness’.  This perspective, it seems, constitutes a prime undercurrent to the above 
researchers’ negative views on Xizangban and its participants, who are, without doubt, radically 
exposed to Chinese modernity and its prosperity. 
 The views of domestic researchers will now be introduced, which might be interesting in 
providing direct contrast to the views of outsiders given above.  Guo (2008) demonstrates and analyses 
the results of a questionnaire investigating the experiences of ex-Xizangban participants in Tibetan 
Studies (Xizang Yanjiu), the academic journal published by a governmental body, the Tibet Academy of 
Social Science.  His informants are one hundred and sixty in total, comprised of people from various 
occupations, such as government officials, teachers and doctors.  Guo’s main conclusion is that “they 
[Xizangban students], who fully enjoy the Party’s education policy on minorities, … became the main 
force for the maintenance of Tibet’s political stability, and also for the national unity. … Because of their 
frequent interactions with Han Chinese, and also of broad travelling there, they came to understand the 
history and culture of their motherland comparatively deeply, … universally embodying fervent passion 
of patriotism” (ibid.: 110).  This kind of optimistic and positive comment is typical not only of those 
found in local journals and newspapers, but also in virtually all the governmental publications dealing 
with Xizangban (e.g. Suo 2011). 
 Interestingly, a Chinese academic equipped with social research methodology conducted a 
thorough investigation into the construction of the Xizangban students’ ethnic identities.  Through his 
ethnographic approach on the Xizangban pupils in Changzhou, Jiangsu Province, Zhu (Beijing Normal 
University) attempts to analyse the ways in which Tibetan identity is constructed within the school and 
Han dominated community (Zhu 2007).  Whilst he explicitly points out some problems within the 
programme, such as the lack of curriculum for Tibetan culture and the ethnic contradiction between the 
pupils and teachers, his main (and perhaps only) argument throughout the book is plainly that Tibetan 
identity is substantially maintained in the school context, due to the dynamics between ideologies 
“assigned” by the state and cultural expressions “asserted” by the students.  It seems that Zhu avoids 
engaging in critical discussion of the political nature of Xizangban, and the students’ ethnic dilemma in 
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a broader cultural context, thus merely reporting on the positive development of ethnic Tibetan identity, 
selectively highlighting some ideological aspects, for example, the students’ “Critical Attitude toward 
Tibet and Tibetan People” and “Admiration of Han Chinese People” (ibid.: 280-1).  The book seems to 
me to be a typical governmental ‘report’, aiming as it does to endorse the educational value of Xizangban, 
which the state wants to disseminate.  It could presumably be said that the scant attention Zhu 
accords the conflicting or contradicting nature of the students’ identities may be in no small part due to 
the fact that he excludes complicated experiences that many ex-Xizangban students have after they 
return to Tibet, from the scope of his research. 
 In contrast to the above two distinct views on Xizangban, we find one approach that is neither 
positive nor negative, and is indeed radical and intriguing, despite the fact that it does not emerge from 
thorough research on the issue.  Tsering Shakya (University of British Columbia), during his interview 
in response to the 2008 demonstrations in Tibet, remarks that “… Tibetan students tend to come out of 
them [Xizangban schools] much more nationalistic – on blogs and websites they are often the ones 
leading complaints against the Chinese government, for depriving them of their cultural identity and 
their language” (2008: 14).  Shakya’s Chinese ‘interlocutor’, Wang Lixiong,10 concurs: “… many of the 
young Tibetans sent to China to be educated become the most radical oppositionists, with the strongest 
[Tibetan] national sentiments” (2002: 109).   
 Both Shakya and Wang may use slightly hyperbolic language, but it is indeed true that the 
aspiration for what one has been irreversibly deprived of tends to become powerful and enduring.  In 
his short essay on identity, the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman contends that identity is “born as a 
problem” (1996: 18).  By this, he means that identity does not become a problem, but is a problem from 
inception, since it is “something one needs do something about － as a task” (ibid.).  Identity may 
never exist as a visible, unproblematic entity, but may be embodied, articulated only in a dis-embedded 
or unencumbered form.  Viewed in this light, what Shakya and Wang argue becomes clearer: the 
Xizangban programme, which uproots the Tibetans from their cultural soils, paradoxically but precisely 
because of this deprivation, operates to strengthen the participants’ consciousness of their ethnic 
identities. 
 It can be said that most outsiders’ discourses on Xizangban participants tend to fall in the two 
bipolar stances described above.  They are stuck in dichotomous discussions as to whether ‘Tibetan 
identity’ is weakened or maintained, or at best how it is so.  The ambiguous and paradoxical nature of 
identity that Shakya and Wang acutely imply seems to be decisively out of the range of the outsiders’ 
cognitive understandings.  Whilst these diametrical stances may be profoundly linked to the 
ideological niches of respective researchers and commentators, there seems to be another reason for the 
divergence, that is, the peculiarity of political position which Xizangban (ex-)participants occupy.  For 
the Chinese authorities, these Tibetans must be reliable and faithful people who ardently share 
national interests with the Han Chinese.  However, they are simultaneously ethnic ‘Others’, who could 
be considered a radically different people from the Han in terms of culture and religion, and possibly 
                                                     10 Wang Lixiong is the husband of the eminent and famous contemporary Tibetan writer Woeser.  For interesting discussions 
exchanged between Tsering Shakya and Wang Lixiong, see The Struggle for Tibet (2009). 
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political sentiments also.  In the eyes of the observers who view the Xizangban programme in a 
negative manner, the Xizangban students and graduates appear as China’s ‘collaborators’, and are 
therefore ‘Tibetan traitors’ who fundamentally support the Chinese state and its imperatives, despite 
their ‘pure’ Tibetan ethnicity.  From both dichotomous stances, those peculiar Tibetans look intimate 
and opponent at once, appearing as radical ‘strangers’ (cf. Simmel 1950[1908]), whose physical 
proximity and similarity belies vast cultural distances.  Considerations of this kind seem to be 
significant in forming a backdrop against which outsiders, motivated by their respective political 
fantasies about what Tibetan identity should be like, tend to select and repress aspects of ‘Otherness’ 
embedded in these Xizangban students. 
 
 
4. Living within an Ethnic Dilemma: Xizangban Students in China and Tibet 
 
It is clear that the experiences and identities of Xizangban participants, their qualities and 
significances evidently vary according to their respective characters, family backgrounds, academic 
performances, and contingencies encountered in China.  However, in my ethnographic interactions 
with the Xizangban-experienced Tibetans11  who resided in China during the 1990s, there were 
conspicuous characteristics and tendencies observed among them – some are unambiguously echoed in 
one of the perspectives we saw in the last section, but others are radically different or comprised of some 
of those discussed.  I will now present various comments and social vocabularies12 expressed by those 
young Tibetan elites with whom I socialised in Lhasa. 
 
*  *  * 
 
In their descriptions of their ‘China experience’ as a whole, the ex-Xizangban students are generally, 
fairly positive.  In particular, they narrate their memories with respective Chinese teachers as nice and 
fruitful – “some of them were like our parents, taking care of us like their own children.”  It may not be 
so unnatural that the teachers would become parent-figures for the children who are separated from 
their homes and birth parents at such a young age.  It seems that many of these Tibetans have 
nurtured grateful and intimate feelings towards kind teachers whose attention and care have become 
unforgettable.  Also, it is worth noting that they never omit to point out the “civilised” (wenming de) 
manners which their Chinese teachers employed.  For example, one female student said to me: 
 
In a school in Tibet, when students violated the rules, the punishment was very severe.  I 
                                                     11 Detailed identity of the informants and many intriguing but sensitive comments are excluded in this article for ethical 
considerations.  Main part of the research methodology is consisted of a combination of unstructured and semi-structured interviews.  
Most of them were conducted from early to mid 2000s during my stay in Lhasa.  These interviews were conducted in Tibetan, 
Chinese, and Japanese and translated into English by the author for the purposes of this article.  12 This section employs the mode of ‘ethnographic present’, firstly for the sake of simplicity, but more importantly because the data 
presented is widely observable at the time of writing the draft of this article (2013), and will be likely to be so for some years to come. 
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remember my strict teacher, Puchung.  He beat students when they forgot homework.  
Sometimes, he did not allow them to eat lunch.  In the worst case, he made the students stand 
on ice with bare feet.  In winter, he forced six boys to swim in a river, just because they did not 
do homework.  Although I owe him a lot in my study of Tibetan language, I think his style of 
teaching was very old fashioned… In China, when the students forgot homework or violated 
the school regulations, teachers never beat them.  They just asked the students to write a 
short essay reflecting on what they had done.  They never ever beat us.  This is one of the 
examples which show the sophisticated and civilised nature of Chinese education. 
 
The Xizangban-experienced Tibetans, almost unanimously, seem to agree that education in China is 
better, civilised, well-facilitated, and superior to that in Tibet, since the teachers in Tibet, especially 
male ones, tend to resort to physical intimidation.  The students found that this was “old fashioned” 
and showed a lack of “aptitude” (suzhi) on the part of the teachers.  By contrast, in China, the students 
are not only given opportunities to learn various modern subjects, they are also taught by Chinese 
teachers who, they claim, are so “highly cultured” that they employ “reason” (daoli) rather than violence 
during the course of their instructions.  The students’ experiences of quality education in China, 
particularly their pride and confidence in having been cultured by these “civilised” teachers, unsurprisingly 
function to develop a sort of elite consciousness among those Tibetans, as will be described later. 
 Whilst there seems to be a general tendency for these Tibetans to have positive impressions of 
their Chinese teachers, their views of the Han Chinese students paint a radically different picture.  In 
many cases, ethnic discrimination has emerged as a prime source of friction and animosity between 
Tibetan and Han students.  “Backward” (luohou), “filthy” (zang) and “savage” (yeman) are the most 
common tropes used by the Chinese in challenging the Xizangban Tibetans.  Insulting questions are 
often asked, such as “Why aren’t you black?  Tibetan skin is normally black.  You must be a fake 
Tibetan!”  “There are only mountains in Tibet.  The football never stays in one place, so you cannot 
play football in Tibet, can you?”  It is often reported that Tibetan students, particularly male ones, tend 
to retaliate against such provocations, for example one man told me his story:  
 
When I was studying in Shanghai, some Chinese students despised me and often made fun of 
me.  It was because of my ethnic origin.  That was so annoying, so I stood up to them one time.  
When one started to ask me if we have rice in Tibet, I said, “Of course, we have,” and he said, 
“Really?  How big is it?”  I replied, “About this size,” I showed my fist.  He looked surprised, 
and I asked, “Do you want to see and eat this rice?”  He said, “Yes.”  So I gave his face my fist 
many many times. 
 
Tibetan male students’ clashes with the Han Chinese are apparently part of their school life13.  Chinese 
                                                     13 I heard, from a government official at the TTB (Tibet Tourism Bureau) in Lhasa, that in the late 1990s they requested relevant 
Xizangban vocational schools to train more ‘male’ students due to the physical toughness of working as a guide in Tibet, but the 
request was rejected.  In the end the schools allowed the majority of enrolments to be of ‘female’ students, since they wanted to avoid 
or diminish the prevalent violent episodes between Tibetan and Han Chinese students. 
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researchers also mention this problem, although without highlighting the issue (e.g. Zhu 2007, Guo 
2008: 105). 
 It is true that Chinese perceptions of Tibetan people, in general, have been accommodating 
multivalent features since the late 1990s, particularly because seductive images of Tibet as “exotic” and 
“mythic” have been circulating, being commercialised in China’s tourism discourses (e.g. Kolås 2004; 
Murakami 2008).  However, it should be emphasised that although this exotic image is very powerful, 
it is merely one current among many, and most ordinary Han Chinese, including school children, seem 
to be at best indifferent to Tibetan Buddhism and its sacred images, or at worst comfortable with 
enduring derogatory images of Tibetans as “barbarian” (manzi).  Thus, not only school children, but 
also adults, the Tibetans say, tend to utter disparaging comments towards Tibetan people, such as 
“Tibetan backward society” or “insanitary, destitute Tibetans”. 
 Chinese negative views of Tibet, understandably, strike at the hearts of Tibetan children who, 
missing their families at home, constantly crave to return there.  Thus it may only be natural that 
Tibetan students in China develop, along with impulses to degrade their ethnic origin, a rebellious 
spirit against Chinese contempt of Tibet.  This rebellious spirit, largely fuelled by their ethnic 
inferiority complex, sometimes leads to the outward practice of physical intimidation.  However, it 
appears simultaneously to reinforce their motivation to study diligently in order to defeat their Chinese 
fellows.  Xizangban students themselves say that they do comparatively well and often excel in 
academic performances. 
The Tibetan students’ experiences of having been uprooted in their childhood, and their 
immediate exposure to the Chinese gaze, are indeed crucial points in their young lives that make them 
acutely aware of their ethnic origins, strengthening their sense of being Tibetan.  Also, their direct 
experiences of Chinese cultural values and customs, without doubt, help them to reflect on their Tibetan 
homelands in a more detached, objective manner, which, if they had continued to stay in Tibet, would 
have been difficult to acquire.  As demonstrated by the above descriptions of the students’ complicated 
interactions with Han Chinese teachers and students, they are encouraged both to dissociate 
themselves from and, simultaneously, to actively accept their ethnic identity.  It is worth noting that 
this ethnic ambivalence naturally continues throughout their schooling in China. 
 
*  *  * 
 
After returning to Tibet, many of the Xizangban youth are confronted with difficulties readapting to the 
ethnic environments for which they have long been yearning.  Guo, a Chinese researcher, despite his 
fervent inclination to the Party line, explicitly raises this issue, and, according to his questionnaire, 
more than sixty percent of his informants find it hard to readjust to a Tibetan ‘cultural environment’ 
(Guo 2008: 107-9).  The following comments by ex-Xizangban students regarding this issue are helpful 
in comprehending the obstacles they face.   
 
… Because I studied in China for seven years, if I compare myself with people who have lived 
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all their lives in Tibet, there is a difference in terms of way of thinking, clothes, food and so on.  
And…  I am an ethnic Tibetan.  Nevertheless, I do not know Tibetan history, and also I do not 
like Tibetan food very much.  In particular, if I eat tsampa [traditional Tibetan staple, made 
from barley], I always have a stomachache.  In China I began to like things that Tibetans 
normally don’t eat for religious reasons, such as fish, pork and eggs. …  I learned various 
things over the last seven years, but when I returned home after a long time, I heard my 
relatives and friends saying to me ‘You are not like a Tibetan’.  At that time, I was so sad, and 
started to become concerned with this matter. … even if I [tried to] think about myself, I could 
not find any ethnic Tibetan characteristics inside me except my speaking Tibetan. … 
 
… [When I was a child] I was influenced by my parents, and became familiar with Buddhist 
customs, such as offerings to deities and not killing sentient beings.  I used to like praying in 
front of Buddhist statues.  …  After I came back to Tibet … some disagreements emerged 
between my parents and me.  For example, they said, ‘It is important to make offerings for our 
future lives.  Thanks to our past lives, we are now happy like this.’  At other times, they told 
me, ‘Everything you have now was determined by your karma.’  I cannot fully follow this kind 
of old idea.  I believe I can orient my fate by myself.  Since I have experienced Xizangban, I 
am different… 
 
I really feel ashamed, if I start to think whether I am like a true Tibetan or not, because, 
looking at myself, I find about sixty percent of me is occupied with Chinese customs, the rest, 
only forty percent is Tibetan. … The Tibetan language which I know is only colloquial.  I have 
big difficulties reading and writing Tibetan letters.  In the university, everybody was so 
surprised to learn that I do not know Tibetan.  Yes, indeed, it is really a funny and strange 
thing, I think, if one cannot write and read one's own ethnic language…   
 
Marx mentioned that, although there are so many different races in the world, they will be 
eventually united into one in the future.  I believe this.  In the contemporary era, the 
interests of youth are more or less becoming the same. … So even if one does not eat tsampa, or 
wear chuba, or if the appearance may look Chinese, as long as one has a wish and 
determination to contribute for the people of Tibet, I think one has a real Tibetanness.  Mind 
and intention for Tibet is the only thing by which one can prove one’s Tibetanness in this 
modern time. 
 
What differentiates the Tibetan people with experience of China from the ones who stayed in 
Tibet all their lives, is their aptitude (suzhi)… you could say their cultural level is different 
from ours.  Tibetans who were never educated in China… their thought (sixiang) has not been 
liberated (jiefang), and their way of thinking is very narrow.  Some local people still believe in 
superstitions.  For example, when they get sick, they just pray to Avalokiteśvara [Deity of 
Compassion] instead of going to a hospital. …   
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When I came back to Lhasa after finishing my four-years’ study in Beijing, the Tibetans did 
look so lazy.  They do not think seriously about their lives, society, and the future of Tibet.  
They are satisfied with their routine everyday lives.  During the daytime they go to the 
teahouse to chat, and at night they go to the Nangma [Tibetan karaoke dancehall] to drink beer 
and fight. … 
 
One can easily identify a variety of complex issues underlying these expressive comments.  First of all, 
Xizangban-experienced Tibetans, with their confidence in having been ‘cultured’, tend to project 
derogative views onto local Tibetans.  This occurs on a range of levels, from clothes and tastes to 
mentalities and aptitudes.   They differentiate themselves from the locals, by employing the negative 
phrases, such as “superstitious,” “indolent,” “conservative,” “emotional” and “passive.”  In a way, these 
Tibetan elites seem to appropriate some of the Chinese imaginings of Tibetans with which they were 
confronted in interior China (Neidi).  The cognitive boundary of civilised ‘us’ vis-à-vis backward ‘them’ 
is sustained by their strong sense of superiority.  However, as easily discerned, it is equally 
intrinsically constituted by their sense of inferiority in having lost “Tibetanness.”  It is indisputably 
true that those Tibetan elites are unequipped with knowledge and experience of Tibetan culture and 
Buddhist traditions.  Their appearance may look Tibetan, and they generally speak colloquial Tibetan, 
however, they not only lack the ability to write and read their native language, but have also, to greater 
or lesser degrees, become alienated from Tibetan traditional sentiments.  In the eyes of local Tibetans, 
they may indeed look somewhat ‘refined’ or ‘urban,’ but they do not appear as ‘true,’ ‘proper’ Tibetans, 
and this is indeed a mortifying and regrettable experience for the young Tibetan elites whose 
consciousness of being ethnic Tibetan has become acute and powerful in China.  Many locals of the 
same generation may simply be envious of these elite Tibetans, whose careers look promising due to 
their expertise and their brilliant command of the Chinese language.  However, for the elites, although 
their sense of inferiority in not possessing “Tibetanness” may often be played down, this complex, for the 
most part, operates as a significant obstacle to them in re-entering the ethnic soils that they have been 
longing for. 
 The un-“Tibetanness” of the Xizangban participants is most symbolically demonstrated by 
their extensive use of Chinese loanwords.  Although it is true that many Tibetans, particularly young 
people in contemporary Lhasa, cannot express themselves fully without relying on Chinese words and 
phrases14, those Tibetan elites who were educated in China for an extensive period are, without doubt, 
the ‘experts’ in their spontaneous, creative usage of the two distinct languages.  In Tibetan there is a 
specific word for (the way of) people who utter an unrecognised, hybrid dialect or language.  They are 
referred to as ra-ma-lug, literally meaning “neither goat nor sheep.”  The connotation is that the sound 
of the speech is neither in one category nor another, and is thus rather meaningless, like the sound of a 
grotesque crossbred animal which is “neither goat nor sheep.”  The word, ra-ma-lug, is certainly a 
                                                     14 The names of new materials and commodities brought from China, such as food and electric devices, and terminologies relating to 
political, economic, and social issues are also commonly expressed in Chinese, even when corresponding Tibetan words do exist. 
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derogatory expression, often directed at the irregular, hybrid usage of Chinese and Tibetan.  
Incidentally, there is a Tibetan word, rgya-ma-bod15, signifying a person of mixed Tibetan and Chinese 
parentage.  It can literally be translated as “neither Tibetan nor Chinese.”  Historically, rgya-ma-bod 
children are limited to those of inter-ethnic marriages between Tibetan women and Chinese soldiers 
and cadres who arrived in Tibet during the 1950s.  They were and are often considered bright and 
sophisticated, having white skin in contrast to the dark skin of pure, native Tibetans.  It was formerly 
only these children who employed ra-ma-lug language.  Recently, however, this improvised technique 
has begun to prevail and become popular, particularly among Xizangban-experienced young Tibetans, 
who can then be regarded as rgya-ma-bod in a socio-linguistic sense.   
 
*  *  * 
 
The elite Tibetans, who went through the ‘China experience’ offered to them through their participation 
in the Xizangban programme during their youth, are ethnically liminal and ambiguous, viewed as 
“neither Tibetan nor Chinese.”  They are caught in an ethnic dilemma – between their pride in being 
civilised in China and their sense of being deprived of “Tibetanness,” or between their sentiments of 
derogation towards local Tibetans and their strong desire to return to their fellows’ cultural 
environment.  In their lives, particularly after returning home, they tend to be occupied with the 
ambivalent desire to both dissociate themselves from and associate with their ethnic home.  They 
appear to swing ceaselessly between these two distinct and uncompromising values: Chinese/Tibetan, 
civilised/backward and modern/tradition.  It seems to be, however, with this in-between quality (cf. 
Bhabha 1994a; 1996) of their ethnic existence, that they activate a remarkable sense of ideological 
balance in living their contemporary political reality.  They may audaciously hold an internal world of 
‘Buddhist belief ’ (i.e. their devotion to the Dalai Lama) whilst disguising themselves in external 
adherence to China’s national interests; they may carefully perform conformity with political repression 
and social change through their rational thinking, while sturdily maintaining a sense of Tibetan 
identity and religious devotion.  As we saw in the previous section, it is this enduring national 
sentiment that Shakya and Wang acutely identified among the ‘Sinicised’ Xizangban-experienced 
Tibetans.  Struggling with their ethnic contradiction, these Tibetans carve out a sort of third modality 
to let the above two conflicting polarities operate within their individual social spheres (e.g. Barnett 
2005). 
 It may be worth presenting a few examples to illuminate the above point.  Among the elite 
Tibetans, there are some who become tour guides due to their brilliant skills in foreign languages.  As 
cultural brokers of their ethnic traditions, they are not only situated between locals and tourist gazes, 
but also between local interests and state power (Murakami 2006).  In Harrell’s (1995) terminology, as 
we saw, they are similar to ‘compradore elites’ who, as ethnic agents, engage in complicity with the state 
to exploit the locals.  Whilst these Tibetans, as state-authorised guides, are responsible for 
                                                     15 The corresponding Chinese word for rgya-ma-bod (neither Chinese nor Tibetan) is banzang banhan (half Tibetan, half Chinese), 
or the rather politically charged term, tuanjie zu (united ethnicity) can also be used as an equivalent. 
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representing Chinese national views and interests, they simultaneously immerse themselves in Tibetan 
Buddhist values in order to fulfil their mediating roles.  A core element of their professional lives is 
that, within their positions as China’s national agents, they simultaneously embody the values of 
Tibetan Buddhist culture, as representatives of Tibetans.  Their careers are neither comprised of the 
national value of being solely Chinese or solely Tibetan, nor the simple reconciliation of both.  They are 
accomplished in an ethnic in-betweenness, wherein these Tibetans negotiate between the two 
incompatible values of Chinese and Tibetan national sentiments16. 
 As a different but analogous example, the story of Gonkar Gyatso17, a modern Tibetan painter, 
helps us to understand the ethnic identity of Xizangban youth.  He is not a Xizangban graduate, but, 
after the Cultural Revolution Gonkar was selected to be sent from Lhasa to Beijing to study art.  After 
intensively training in modern art for a period of several years, he returned to Lhasa.  Then, Gonkar, 
like our Xizangban students, ‘felt like a Chinese looking at Tibet’ on his arrival (Harris 1999: 179), 
sensing he was estranged from his natal cultural landscape.  During his cultural rupture from the local 
environment, he began to rediscover traditional Buddhist painting (thangga), and, during the 1980s, he 
and his colleagues developed modernist skills and tastes through which they expressed their dislocated, 
lingering ethnic selves.  In a sense, this was an attempt to “reinstate their Tibetanness (ibid. 185)” 
through employing the style of modernism.  The result was ‘modern thangka’ that both uses and 
disuses traditional motifs.  After his flight to Dharamsala, Gonkar’s particular style became evident in 
his preference for allowing the iconometric grids (that were part of the traditional preparatory phase of 
thangka painting) to remain visible in his completed Buddhist images, whilst leaving the details of 
deities and demons obscure.  Claire Harris, in her fascinating book on modern Tibetan paintings, 
points out that “[f]or him, line and measurement are of greater value in understanding fundamental 
artistic and philosophic principles” (ibid. 195)18, and that his distinctive style certainly originates from 
his ambivalent position both as ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ to his surrounding cultural spaces.  His 
preference for “form over content” (ibid. 194), she argues, was a tentative answer to his struggle to find 
significant Tibetan character in the manner of modern painting. 
 If there is any striking parallel between Gonkar Gyatso and our elite Xizangban Tibetans, 
that is their experience of estrangement from their native soil on the one hand, and their wish to 
retrieve their lost ethnicity, on the other.  At a metaphorical level, both of them indeed share the 
existential defects which reinforce their sense of being uprooted – that of lacking the ‘content’ of 
Tibetanness.  However, they simultaneously tend to (or even are ordained to) accommodate the 
                                                     16 The author is fully aware of the vagueness of this paragraph, which came out of ethical considerations.  The aim of this paragraph 
is just to identify the conflicting political values within which tour guides locate themselves, rather than to explicate how both Chinese 
and Tibetan national sentiments are tactfully enacted by the guides on a daily basis. 17 He resides in London, and continues his career as a painter (http://gonkargyatso.com). 18 Claire Harris remarks that Gyatso’s preference for ‘form over content’ in his modern thangka is something more than modernist 
taste, but that the iconometric grids of traditional thangka could be perceived to represent the codified memories of Tibetan culture.  
For this insightful point, she has recourse to an art historian, Erwin Panofsky, who, analysing medieval European and ancient Egyptian 
paintings, avers that “iconometric codes, rather than content or attached narratives, revealed far more about the aesthetics of a 
particular cultural group” (Harris 1999: 194-5) 
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inconsistent values found within respective social fields to reinstate their versions of ethnic Tibetan 
identity in the midst of Chinese modernity.  Certainly, I do not intend to argue that all Xizangban 
graduates are equipped with these similar moralities and ideologies, regardless of their characters and 
social positions, but merely want to indicate that they are open to the significant possibilities wherein 
they could redefine conventional perspectives on Tibetan identity, through cultivating their peculiar 
cultural backgrounds and political positionalities. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks – National Imaginings, Postcolonial Perspectives and Xizangban 
 
In contemporary Lhasa there are a variety of national imaginings, fantasies and rumours in constant 
circulation.19  Varying in their tones and contents, some are outspokenly nationalistic, but others 
tactfully involve implicit and oblique national metaphors, which usually appear fragmented or obscure 
to the eyes of outsiders. 
For Japanese nationals who have experienced living there, it is not difficult to encounter the 
locals – particularly the educated ones – who express ambiguous but simultaneously explicit imaginings 
about Japan.  The Japanese as “evil” and “foolish” is the view Japanese visitors or residents are 
generally familiar with.  Indeed, this is a common picture disseminated in China’s formal education 
and various patriotic films portraying Japan’s colonial aggression against China.  Naturally, Tibetans 
in Chinese territory are also informed and inculcated by such images, thus familiarising themselves 
with them to varying degrees.  The other strand of imaginings about the Japanese is of a totally 
opposite nature: the Japanese as “courteous,” “compassionate” and “excellent at technology”.  The 
grounds of this Tibetan imagining are worth noting: the belief that Japanese share an affinity with 
Tibetans, both in terms of ethnicity and religion (Buddhism).20  It is in fact far from true that the 
Japanese largely practise Buddhism, as Tibetans may (want to) imagine.  Whilst Buddhism is 
certainly one important element amongst Japanese traditions, many contemporary Japanese are 
disenchanted with domestic Buddhism.  Therefore, even if Tibetans are eager to attribute a 
“compassionate character” to the Japanese, on the basis of having Buddhism in common as national 
religion, this does not accord with reality.  However, Tibetans’ perceived ethnic affinity with the 
Japanese, partly reinforced by an inculcated image of a colonial evilness vis-à-vis China, seems to be 
enduring and powerful enough to support the fantasies above.  Tibetan fantasies about Japan, when 
mentioned, are most typically enunciated with tropes like “(technologically) developed Buddhist nation” 
or, “civilised kin nation.” 
This Tibetan imagining is purely a myth.  Although this Tibetan myth may be trivial in its 
                                                     19 Outsiders’ imaginings of Tibet have been investigated for more than a few decades, but those of Tibetans about other nations 
(except China and India) have not been sufficiently explored and may be worthy subject of future research.  Contemporary Tibetans 
tend to be treated as the ‘objects’ of Western or Chinese imaginings, but they can equally be approached as the ‘subjects’ of imaginings, 
expressing distinctive views and fantasies concerning other nations and nationalities. 20 The Tibetan belief in ethnical affinities between the Japanese and themselves is not just a modern construction, but is reported to 
have existed in a certain section of Lhasa society since the early twentieth century, when Tibet desperately needed international 
alliances with other nations against China.  See for example Hoshi (1977) and Bell (1924: 220) for historical Tibetan fascinations 
with Japan. 
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nature, and normally demonstrated in a contingent manner, it seems to provide a distinctive angle from 
which to view the inherent dilemma of modern Tibetan identity discussed in the previous section. 
The myth implicitly echoes Japan’s colonial past in China.  A projected intimacy towards 
Japan may not be unrelated to present Tibetan predicaments under Chinese rule, a nation which Japan 
once exploited in a colonial manner.  However, the most fascinating part of this myth for many 
contemporary Tibetans seems to lie in its indication of the possibility of the mutual non-exclusiveness 
between Buddhism and modernity.  As seen in the previous section, modernity, science and superiority 
are always associated with the Chinese, whereas Buddhism, tradition and backwardness are associated 
with Tibetans.  Such ideological dichotomy tends to naturalise a hierarchical ethnic relation, 
restricting the scope of national imaginings that Tibetans aspire to activate and enlarge.  The myth 
indeed challenges the prevailing ideology, and it is in itself a form of social practice (cf. Appadurai 
1990)21 in the sense that it alludes to the future potentials of Tibetans by recourse to their imagined 
ethnic affinity.  Thus it is not surprising that modern Tibetans like our Xizangban graduates, who have 
an acute sense of their dissipating traditional identity, seem to have difficulty remaining indifferent to 
what the myth implies.  Often viewed as “neither Tibetan nor Chinese,” these Tibetans are naturally 
eager to look to a more constructive aspect of their ethnic dilemma, that is, the value of both modernity 
and tradition, which the myth enshrines.  To put it another way, the evocative power of the myth 
precisely lies in its shedding a positive light on the ideological rupture embedded in the identity of the 
‘civilised’ Tibetans. 
 
*  *  * 
 
Perhaps at this juncture, it will not be too abrupt to introduce the argument of a postcolonial critic, 
Homi Bhabha, in order both to understand the nature of the myth and, more importantly, to provide a 
theoretical framework to explicate further the central theme of this article – the national identities of 
the Xizangban Tibetans.  Bhabha expressively discusses the complicated identities of colonised people 
situated at the ideological intersection between the values of superior, modern and civilised on the one 
hand, and those of inferior, traditional and backward on the other.  He argues that the relationship of 
postcolonial experience to a dominant culture is not simply antagonistic, but often generates 
empowerment22 through one’s active commitment to the ‘undecidability’ or ‘indeterminism’ between 
hierarchical, conflicting values.  In his sympathetic forward to Franz Fanon’s masterpiece, Black Skin, 
                                                     21 For comprehending the nature of the local practice of imagining, I accord with Arjun Appadurai (e.g. 1990; 1991; 1996), who 
contends that an imagination (or imagined representation) is neither a mere fantasy nor a simple escape, but can be a form of social 
practice by which an individual can engage in a negotiation between sites of agencies and possibilities inspiringly presented by Others.  
In his famous discussion on ‘global cultural economy, ’ he gives us the insight that “… [t]hese scripts [that are woven of the imagined 
lives of Others] can and do get disaggregated into complex sets of metaphors by which people live as they help to constitute narratives 
of the Other and proto-narratives of possible lives, fantasies which could become prolegomena to the desire for acquisition and 
movement” (Appadurai 1990: 9).   22 See also Spivak’s notions of ‘enabling violence’ or ‘enabling violation’ by which the colonised people are made socially visible, 
empowered to live in a colonial regime (e.g. Spivak 1990; 1996). 
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White Masks, Bhabha nevertheless criticises Fanon’s representation of the “Manichean structure of 
colonial consciousness” (1994b: 120), that is, the psychological divide between the white colonialist self 
and the black colonised other, and furthermore, Fanon’s ‘naïve’ desire to transcend dualities in a 
Hegelian, humanistic sense.  Instead, Bhabha suggests standing in “the non-dialectical moment of 
Manicheaism” (ibid.) and then crossing, shifting the boundaries strategically.  He claims:  
 
… a half acknowledgement of that Otherness which has left its traumatic mark.  In that 
uncertainty lurks the white masked Black man; and from such ambivalent identification － 
black skin, white masks － it is possible, I believe, to redeem the pathos of cultural confusion 
into a strategy of political subversion (ibid. 120-121; original emphasis). 
 
Bhabha encourages those victimised people, despite possible cultural estrangement from the 
mainstream, to fully embrace and cultivate their ambivalent positionalities; to dive into the 
contestatory subjectivities embedded within themselves.  This act of ideological diving, according to 
him, would lead them to enter the “in-between” space composed both of ‘the coloniser’ and ‘the colonised’, 
wherein they could retrieve and activate a hitherto negated self; “[t]o be true to a self one must learn to 
be a little untrue, out-of-joint with the signification of cultural generalizability” (Bhabha 1994a: 137). 
 Surely, the postcolonial perspective that Bhabha illuminatingly presents helps us to 
comprehend the nature of the identities and cultural experiences of our Xizangban Tibetans.  As shown, 
those Tibetans, civilised in the colonial centre, are ordained to accommodate dual incommensurable 
values and cultures through simultaneous identification with, and alienation from, Chinese modernity 
and Tibetan national sentiments.  They are caught in an existential dilemma, as ambiguous ethnic 
beings divided by the values of the Chinese and those of the Tibetans.  Simultaneously, however, they 
are politically inclined to the both/and option of postcolonial positionality that the myth above implies 
(we may well call it a postcolonial myth).  In this light, the problems and potentials of the Xizangban 
educated Tibetans can be said to be very close to those of the postcolonial subjects that Bhabha and 
other scholars (cf. Williams and Chrisman 1994) articulate. 
 The above discussion raises the important and unavoidable issue of whether or not the 
contemporary situation in Tibet and its people can be justly termed ‘postcolonial’.  The Chinese 
government adamantly claims that Tibet was never ever ‘colonised’ but rather ‘liberated’ by communist 
reforms.  According to this view, the theoretical framework of ‘postcolonial’ is untenable and unjust.  
In contrast, the Tibetan exile community would assert that present conditions in Tibet can never be 
interpreted as postcolonial, since typically colonial policies, such as systematic immigration and 
restriction on religions, are being forcefully implemented in contemporary Tibet.  That is to say, Tibet 
is presently being colonised by a vicious regime, and the people there are victims of Chinese occupation.  
Against this backdrop, however, I would argue that the dominance of these uncompromising nationalist 
ideologies is the precise reason why the postcolonial perspective would be helpful in examining the 
entangled national identities of Tibetans like our Xizangban elites. 
One of the most significant virtues of this postcolonial framework is its attempt to shift 
emphasis away from the ideology of imperialist historicity and anti-colonialism, in which a bipolar form 
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of representation of the ‘superior’ and the ‘inferior’ is predominant, towards focus on the actual lives of 
the colonised subjects situated at the intersection between opposing values.  Indeed, the postcolonial 
perspective in the context of Tibet, insofar as it never underestimates the enduring verticality of the 
colonial relationship between the Chinese and the Tibetans,23 could be a constructive framework to 
dismantle conventional, simplistic views of Tibetans, through revealing the ‘transverse zone’ where 
distinctive cultural codes and values flow from one side to the other according to the practical needs and 
political wishes of the people positioned there. 
 James Clifford, an eminent cultural anthropologist, avers that the making and remaking of 
identities takes place in the “contact zones, along the policed and transgressive intercultural frontiers of 
nations, peoples and locales (1997: 7).”  In the case of our Xizangban Tibetans, they are not only 
situated in these contact zones, but also, it seems to me, lived as the “contact zones”, wherein different, 
contradicting social values intersect, thereby constantly requiring them to reformulate their modes of 
existence. 
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